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Scientific controversies have long excited both the 
passions of participants and the interest of social 
scientists [1]. For researchers into the nature of science, 
controversies have the advantage that social processes 
normally hidden in laboratories and offices are brought 
into open view in a dramatic fashion. Assumptions that 
are normally implicit are challenged by disputants, 
routine procedures scrutinized and weak points in 
arguments attacked. The disadvantage of studying 
controversies is that it may give an unrealistic picture 
of the day-to-day operations of normal science (Mulkay 
et al. 1983). In any case, controversy analysis is a 
thriving field of study, no doubt due, in part, to the 
human drama and social implications associated with 
many controversies. 
 
The traditional social science approach to scientific 
controversies has been to study the social dynamics of 
science, assuming that there is a scientific truth 
underlying the debate. Usually one side is believed to 
be much closer to this core truth, and the task of the 
social scientist then becomes one of explaining why the 
other side persists in its claims. The social scientist 
usually accepts the judgment of the most authoritative 
scientists about scientific realities. 
 
This positivist approach, a "sociology of scientific 
error", has been challenged by relativist analysts of 
science. In the strong program in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge, the analyst is enjoined to treat 
competing truth claims symmetrically (Bloor 1976). 
Instead of looking only at the side considered wrong by 
scientific authorities, the knowledge claims on both 
sides of the controversy are examined, and an attempt 
is made to explain them using social categories [2]. The 
relativist program differs from the traditional approach 
in two major, related ways. First, the social analysis is 
applied to scientific knowledge claims, as well as to 
wider social dynamics. Second, both sides in the 
controversy are examined using the same repertoire of 
conceptual tools. This contrasts with the traditional 
approach, in which scientific knowledge claims are 
seldom scrutinized (that task is left to the scientists), 
and social explanations are selectively applied to the 
side without authoritative scientific backing. It should 
be noted that relativism is a set of methodological 
specifications. Relativists may (or may not) believe that 
there is an underlying scientific truth. But for the 
purposes of social analysis, they set the issue of truth 
and falsity aside: it is not treated as relevant to the 
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social investigation. 
 
Under both positivist and relativist approaches, the 
controversy is normally treated as something external 
to the researcher. It is "out there": the social research 
itself is not viewed as part of the controversy. It is this 
pervasive assumption that is questioned in this paper. 
 
Within the traditional positivist interpretation of 
science, the role of researchers in relation to scientific 
controversies appears to raise few methodological 
problems. The conventional view is that social 
researchers should be objective in their assessment of 
social evidence. This usually implies that the social 
researcher is not directly involved in the issue being 
studied. 
 
However, because positivists treat scientific knowledge 
as different from other sorts of belief such as religion or 
"public opinion", objectivity in relation to scientific 
knowledge appears to mean, for the social scientist, 
accepting received scientific facts and theories as the 
truth. It can be argued that because science decides 
which side is correct, it does not compromise the social 
scientist's objectivity to become involved in support of 
the correct side. Indeed, the social researcher may be 
attracted to the controversy because of requests from 
participants, or be drawn to it by a duty to support 
truth against misguided opponents. Martin Gardner's 
popular treatment Fads and Fallacies in the Name of 
Science illustrates well the approach also adopted in 
more scholarly treatments. From the point of view of 
those on the other side, social scientists taking part in 
this way are definitely "captives of controversy". From 
these social scientists' own point of view, and that of 
the side of scientific orthodoxy, they are simply 
supporting truth against falsity and are not 
compromised at all. 
 
A relativist or social constructivist approach does not 
necessarily raise dilemmas for social researchers either, 
but for an entirely different reason. Within the strong 
program, researchers study disputes "naturalistically", 
and this requires their epistemological and social 
neutrality. Social researchers, we are told, should not 
grind an evaluative axe. If researchers are "captured" 
by either side and become part of the debate, then they 
are deemed to have failed to maintain a symmetrical 
approach. It is this assumption within the relativist 
perspective which is the main focus of our paper. 
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A leading instance of alleged "capturing" in relativist 
controversy analysis is the study by Collins and Pinch 
of the dispute over the existence of psychic phenomena. 
Their paper, "The Construction of the Paranormal: 
Nothing Unscientific is Happening", analyzes the 
tactics used by both parapsychologists and orthodox 
scientists in the course of the controversy. According to 
Collins and Pinch, "controversy highlights social 
processes with particular clarity" (Collins and Pinch 
1979, 238), and the study of the social processes 
involved in these attempts to legitimate parapsychology 
also provides insights into the maintenance of the 
dominant scientific culture. 
 
From the perspective of their relativist stance, Collins 
and Pinch argue that the "actual existence" of the 
paranormal phenomena is redundant and that their 
position on the existence of the phenomena is neutral 
(Collins and Pinch 1979, 262). However, in an added 
note we learn that Collins and Pinch's paper has been 
drawn into the debate and used to support the 
parapsychologists' case. Parapsychologists commended 
the paper, while critics of the field charged the authors 
with "selective reporting" rather than scientific inquiry 
(Collins and Pinch 1979, 263). 
 
Defending themselves against these charges, Collins 
and Pinch claim they are "professional sociologists" 
who are "disinterested in these questions" (Collins and 
Pinch 1979, 263). This defence is not accepted by the 
discourse analysts Mulkay, Potter and Yearley, who 
sought to undermine the relativist analysis of 
parapsychology by Collins and Pinch by alleging that 
the latter were "in a disguised fashion, constructing 
their analysis from the point of view of (some) 
parapsychologists" (Mulkay et al. 1983, 187). That 
partisans on both sides of the controversy saw Collins 
and Pinch's analysis as favoring the parasychologists' 
case is used by the discourse analysts to support their 
criticism (Mulkay et al. 1983, 188). According to 
Mulkay, Potter and Yearley, the reason for this lack of 
social neutrality is that Collins and Pinch uncritically 
adopted the parapsychologists' perspectives and 
terminology. 
 
This methodological demand for a separation between 
researcher and researched may appear to work for 
historical studies and for disputes contained within the 
scientific community. In such cases the research 
Page 4 of 27Captives of controversy by Scott, Richards and Martin
subjects cannot, or may not want to, deploy the social 
research in their struggles: historical subjects, being 
dead, cannot bite back, and social scientists have little 
perceived status in technical disputes between scientific 
experts. But this convenient separation between 
researcher and researched breaks down in current 
controversies which involve matters of public policy or 
some other strong link to the broader community. We 
will use our own experiences in controversy analysis to 
illustrate this claim. For convenience, each of the three 
case studies is presented in the first person, though 
each presentation has been shaped by our mutual 




Pam Scott on the controversy 
over the importation of live 
foot-and mouth disease virus 
into the Australian Animal 
Health Laboratory 
When I began my study into the establishment of the 
Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL), I knew 
almost nothing about the topic apart from a few brief 
newspaper reports. The establishment of the laboratory 
was initially thought to provide a good case study for 
looking at how government decisions about "big" 
science and technology are made in Australia. 
 
The idea that Australia needed a laboratory to diagnose 
exotic animal diseases was raised in the late 1950s. 
Investigations into the feasibility and desirability of 
establishing such a facility were conducted at various 
stages throughout the 1960s and 1970s by the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organization (CSIRO) and the Commonwealth (federal 
government) Departments of Health and Primary 
Industry, and these groups very actively lobbied for 
support from the government. Government approval 
was given for the AAHL in 1974; building commenced 
in 1978 and was completed in 1985[3]. 
 
There was little public debate about the need to 
establish a laboratory for diagnosing and studying 
livestock diseases which, by the good fortune of 
geographical isolation and the good management of 
strict quarantine regulations, Australia had avoided. 
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The reason for this lack of attention was that most of 
the planning was not made public. Most citizens, 
including farmers who had a particular interest in 
animal health, were unaware of the plans to build the 
laboratory and of its functions. 
 
It was not until 1981 that farmers' interest was captured 
when they learnt that CSIRO had sought and received 
government approval to import live foot-and-mouth 
disease virus into the laboratory when it was 
completed. It should be understood that foot-and-
mouth disease is especially feared by farmers. It is 
highly infectious, and an outbreak would result in the 
immediate closure of Australia's export market for 
meat and livestock, thereby costing the Australian 
economy millions of dollars and ruining many farmers. 
 
The controversy which developed over the importation 
of the live virus contained a number of elements. First, 
there was the debate on risk: some claimed there was 
no risk from having the virus at AAHL; others (mainly 
farmers) argued that any risk was unacceptable. 
Structural security of the laboratory, the likelihood of 
human error, and the consequences of not having the 
live virus were all hotly debated. Then there was the 
debate on the need to have live virus. Proponents 
argued that the laboratory could not function 
effectively without live virus, while opponents (who 
included scientists) claimed live virus was not needed. 
CSIRO, which was to administer the laboratory and 
was its main advocate, unwittingly called into question 
the need for the laboratory itself when some of its 
scientists claimed that without live virus the facility 
would be a "white elephant" (Scott 1989). 
 
Laboratory proponents claimed that farmers' fears 
were irrational and emotional and were fanned along 
by a few scientists who feared their research budgets 
would be adversely affected by AAHL's research 
program. Opponents pointed to "empire-building" and 
stubbornness as CSIRO's motivation. So the battle lines 
were drawn and the debate raged for several years 
(Scott 1988a). 
 
I tried to keep clear of any active involvement in the 
debate. I had no interest, involvement, or stake in the 
outcome, and no expertise in veterinary health matters. 
I intended to be dispassionate and objective in 
reporting my findings, and I was confident that I could 
maintain the necessary neutrality. 
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My research began with the readily available public 
documents on the laboratory, such as government and 
parliamentary reports, but then I needed to go beyond 
these public accounts of decision-making and talk to 
the individuals involved. My first encounter was with 
an "insider" opponent who provided me with a variety 
of background materials and information about which 
documents to request from the authorities. So to some 
extent, I "entered" the debate via the opponents of the 
laboratory. 
 
My next major encounter was with CSIRO. This is the 
organization responsible for administering and 
operating the laboratory, and its most powerful and 
prestigious advocate. When I met with members of the 
CSIRO Executive to discuss obtaining access to CSIRO 
files, their attitude was extremely defensive and 
cautious. They agreed to give me access provided I 
cleared anything I wrote on the subject with them. This 
approval opened up vast quantities of material and 
facilitated access to the files of other government 
bodies. 
 
While both sides supplied me with information, the 
laboratory proponents did so reluctantly, perceiving my 
interest as a threat to their already damaged 
reputation, and whilst appearing cooperative, they were 
anxious to maintain control over my work. The 
laboratory opponents, on the other hand, were not 
uniform in their views - some saw my work as exposing 
the politics of CSIRO, some saw it as vindicating their 
opposition, others hoped it would settle the issue - but 
all thought it was important to reveal and record what 
had happened. 
 
My detailed documentation of the decision-making 
process and the background to the controversy was not 
meant to support one side or the other, to nominate 
winners or losers, but to reveal the social processes 
shaping the knowledge claims. The disputants 
themselves, however, were not so sociologically 
enlightened. They adopted a traditional positivist 
stance. For them it was a conflict with a right and a 
wrong side, with winners and losers. And my work was 
incorporated into the debate. 
 
The opponents of the laboratory were primarily 
farmers and their organizations, but they also included 
members of the public and some scientists, who were 
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critical of what they perceived as an unnecessary, 
costly, and high-risk enterprise. They had been labeled 
by the laboratory proponents (who were primarily 
veterinary scientists, CSIRO, and government 
bureaucrats), as irrational, unscientific, emotional, 
biased, and politically and economically motivated in 
their actions. This depiction placed the opponents at a 
considerable disadvantage in the context of the 
proponents' claim to objective scientific authority. My 
analysis corrected this imbalance by showing the non-
scientific, value-laden, and politically-motivated basis 
for the proponents' decision-making. Because this was 
seen as undermining the proponents, I, like Collins and 
Pinch, was perceived by both sides as favoring the 
opponents. 
 
The opponents of the laboratory described my work as 
scholarly and well-documented. The proponents 
claimed that it was a partisan presentation, that I had 
started from a conclusion and then sought evidence to 
support it, and that I wore blinkers. One of them called 
one of my papers a "mischievous beat-up" and made 
reference to "dung beetles digging in the droppings of 
time". When I submitted work in progress to CSIRO it 
was closely scrutinized and my interpretations and 
conclusions were constantly challenged. On the other 
hand, the laboratory opponents requested copies of my 
papers, circulated them, and invited me to address 
farmers' groups. 
 
One of the effects of my research was to make available 
information that was not widely known or had been 
forgotten. Many participants did not know the 
background to the establishment of the laboratory, and 
even those involved in the decision-making did not 
always have a complete picture of events. The 
spreading of information and even the knowledge that 
someone was actively researching the controversy 
altered the debate. In other words, my very presence 
changed what I was investigating. 
 
Was I a bad researcher who was captured by the 
laboratory opponents and seduced by their attention, 




Brian Martin on the 
fluoridation controversy 
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The question of whether fluoride should be added to 
public water supplies to reduce tooth decay has been 
one of the most vociferously debated issues concerning 
science and public policy over the past forty years. It 
involves scientific issues, such as the assessment of the 
effectiveness of fluoride in reducing tooth decay and 
the status of claims of health risks, such as skeletal 
fluorosis, allergic and intolerance reactions, and genetic 
effects including cancer. It also involves ethical and 
political issues, including the compulsion implicit in 
adding a chemical to the water supply to treat the 
individual, and the question of who should make 
decisions about fluoridation. The issue has long been 
highly polarized, scientifically and politically. 
 
One of the reasons I undertook my study was my long 
exposure to the issues through a colleague who is one of 
the prominent scientist critics of fluoridation. But, 
unlike the anti-fluoridationists, I have never been 
passionately concerned about whether water supplies 
are actually fluoridated. I regularly drank large 
amounts of fluoridated water before becoming 
acquainted with the controversy, and continue to do so. 
My interest was and is in the politics of science as 
revealed through the controversy. 
 
One of my first tasks was to study earlier sociological 
treatments of the fluoridation controversy. There have 
been many dozens of these, and almost all of them use 
a traditional positivist approach: fluoridation is 
assumed to be scientifically correct, and there is little or 
no discussion of the scientific evidence. Scientific 
evidence raised by critics of fluoridation is almost 
entirely unmentioned in these studies. The social 
scientists have seen their task as one of determining the 
reasons for the opposition to fluoridation. A range of 
hypotheses have been studied: the demographic 
characteristics of opponents have been studied 
(opponents were found, in some studies, to be 
disproportionately low in education, politically 
conservative, and older); the opposition has been 
explained by concepts such as irrationality, alienation 
and confusion (Martin 1989). 
 
A number of the social researchers reveal not only their 
strong commitment to fluoridation but also the relation 
of this commitment to their studies. The United States 
Public Health Service, a leading force behind 
fluoridation since 1950, invited Aaron Spector to study 
the issue, and this led to the major project by Crain, 
Page 9 of 27Captives of controversy by Scott, Richards and Martin
Katz and Rosenthal (1969, v). These authors assume 
that fluoridation is "progressive" and "rational" and 
agonize over the political difficulty that many citizens 
oppose it (1969, 227-228). 
 
Many social scientists studying fluoridation have seen 
their research as a source of insight and advice for the 
proponents. For example, Kegeles (1961), in a 
commentary on social science research on fluoridation, 
concluded that "While future research will undoubtedly 
continue to emphasize understanding rather than 
action, there seems reason to be optimistic that help for 
the [pro-fluoridation] practitioner will be one of the 
eventual by-products." Gamson (1965) wrote on "How 
to lose a fluoridation referendum", giving counsel to 
proponents on what they should not do. 
 
Twenty years later, the quest for social science 
understanding useful to proponents continues. 
Hastreiter (1983) tried to combine several different 
social science perspectives: "Only by using a broad 
spectrum of behavioral social science analyses can the 
complex process of fluoridation conflict be 
conceptualized and ameliorated." (490). There is not a 
clear boundary between social science research and 
what can be called "campaigning literature". Isman's 
(1981) "Fluoridation: strategies for success" is a good 
example. Isman draws on both social science studies 
and practical experience in drawing up 
recommendations for successful fluoridation 
campaigns. 
 
As noted earlier, some would argue that there is no 
contradiction involved in partisan social research if it is 
assumed that one side in the controversy is supported 
by scientific truth. Indeed, participation in the 
controversy on this particular side may be considered a 
moral imperative. Gamson (1961, 54) concludes that 
"Those who believe that truth needs no advocate need 
only witness a few of the more heated fluoridation 
controversies." Hastreiter (1983, 486) states that "as a 
lesson in sociopolitical interaction, the failure to 
achieve universal water fluoridation is a demonstration 
of humanity's tenuous ability to apply the knowledge of 
proved, cost-effective disease prevention to everyone's 
benefit." Such quotations abound in the field [4]. 
 
Unlike most of these previous researchers, I undertook 
my study with the intention of using the tools of 
relativist analysis. Obtaining and studying both the 
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scientific and sociological literature on fluoridation 
through standard sources, literature searches and so 
on, presented no apparent methodological problems. It 
was when interacting with fluoridation partisans that 
the stance of symmetry became increasingly difficult. 
 
My social interaction with partisans in the controversy 
began with letters to people outside Australia who had 
been involved in the debate. Out of letters to 51 
individuals in 11 countries over several years, I received 
replies to 36. There was not much difference between 
the response rates for known proponents and 
opponents of fluoridation. But some of the opponents 
were much more energetic correspondents than any of 
the proponents, plying me with numerous articles, 
names of people to contact, references and comments. 
No pro-fluoridationist did the same. This differential 
response was bound to affect my writing: I was aware 
of materials, such as personal correspondence, most of 
which had been supplied by anti-fluoridationists. 
 
As part of my study, I interviewed 11 leading 
proponents and 6 leading opponents of fluoridation in 
Australia, most of whom were scientists, dentists, or 
doctors. Only a few of these knew of me and my work 
before the interviews. Most of them were forthright and 
helpful. But it soon became clear that my minor role in 
the controversy had preceded me. 
 
Professor Elsdon Storey at the University of Melbourne 
told me, after an hour or so of our interview, that he 
knew what I was going to conclude in my study: he had 
seen a report of a talk of mine on suppression of 
dissent, in which I referred to cases of suppression of 
scientist opponents of fluoridation. He demanded that 
anything I wrote which mentioned him be shown to 
him in entirety before being seen by anyone else. 
 
I subsequently received a letter from another senior 
academic proponent of fluoridation, Professor Jack 
Martin [5], also requesting that he not be quoted in any 
way without first approving the entire article. I inferred 
that he had talked to Storey after my interviews with 
them both. After I had prepared a draft paper called 
"Coherency of viewpoints among fluoridation 
partisans" (later published as Martin 1988a), I sent 
copies to all interviewees for their comments. I 
designed the text so that I did not refer directly to the 
contents of the interviews with Storey and Martin, only 
noting the existence of the interviews and referring to a 
Page 11 of 27Captives of controversy by Scott, Richards and Martin
published letter by Storey. I received comments from 5 
of the 6 opponents interviewed, including some quite 
critical ones. The only proponent responses were from 
Storey, who said he did not want to be associated with 
my article in any way, and Martin, who requested that 
he not be mentioned in the article, not even in the list 
of interviewees (a request which I declined). 
 
Clearly, this was a very one-sided response to my work. 
It was not unexpected, since my symmetrical analysis 
of the controversy meant that the anti-fluoridationists 
were given much more credence than is usually the case 
in the standard scientific or sociological literature. The 
effect was to isolate me from further insights into pro-
fluoridation thinking (except through the literature), 
while keeping channels open to anti-fluoridation 
thinking. 
 
Later, I organized my material into a book and tried to 
obtain critical comments on the manuscript from both 
proponents and opponents. The three opponents I 
approached each readily provided significant 
comments on the draft, but obtaining comments from 
proponents was a more difficult task. I received 
comments from only 4 of the 12 international 
proponents of fluoridation I approached. These 
responses were invaluable: without them, it would have 
been far harder to obtain a good picture of the 
proponent case, and even easier to be drawn into the 
camp of the opponents. 
 
When my papers appeared in Metascience, Social 
Studies of Science and Sociological Quarterly, the 
fluoridation opponents circulated copies of them. The 
work was useful to their cause. In one case, a leading 
British opponent made my papers the subject of a 
couple of his newsletters (although to some extent for 
the purposes of criticism). 
 
The fluoridation controversy is so highly polarized that 
any analysis that is not strongly pro-fluoridation is seen 
as anti-fluoridation. In this context, many proponents 
apparently saw me as an opponent as soon as they saw 
the type of symmetrical analysis I was undertaking. 
Therefore, in one sense there was not a lot of effort 
required to "capture" me to the anti-fluoridation cause. 
Nevertheless, a number of anti-fluoridationists were 
quite critical of some of my statements. The most 
common criticism from both sides was that I hadn't 
given enough credence to the overwhelming body of 
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science that supported their case. The trouble was that 
the two sides differed so completely about how the 
science was to be interpreted! 
 
My experiences cannot be attributed specifically to 
adopting a relativist framework. Similar problems beset 
positivists who give less than complete support to the 
orthodox scientific position. Mazur's (1973, 1981) 
classic paper "Disputes between experts" analyzed the 
rhetoric of both proponents and opponents of 
fluoridation, as well as partisans in the controversy 
over low-level ionizing radiation. Mazur's article has 
been highly cited in the general social science 
literature, but it has seldom been mentioned by pro-
fluoridation social analysts. 
 
Edward Groth III (1973) studied fluoridation in the 
early 1970s as an issue of public policy. He examined 
the scientific evidence and arguments on both sides in 
considerable detail. Groth was not interested in 
supporting or opposing fluoridation, but his intended 
"neutral" position was not seen this way by partisans. 
Opponents eagerly supplied him with information; 
proponents tried to discredit him personally and 
portray him as an anti-fluoridationist. Groth avoided 
being a "captive of controversy" only by getting out of 
the area (Groth 1988). 
 
Groth did not use a relativist conceptual framework, 
but his adoption of a "neutral", critical-of-all-claims 
stance served as a de facto relativism. Many of Groth's 
experiences were forerunners of my own. The stance of 
relativist symmetry seems to provide no special 




Evelleen Richards on the 
vitamin C and cancer 
controversy 
The vitamin C and cancer controversy centers on the 
attempt by Linus Pauling (Nobel laureate and well-
known anti-war activist and advocate of vitamin C as 
both preventative and therapy for the common cold) 
and Ewan Cameron (a Scottish surgeon) to 
theoretically elaborate and demonstrate their claim 
that vitamin C megadose can control or palliate cancer. 
It is a well polarized controversy that has spilled over 
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into the popular press. Pauling and Cameron apart, the 
interested parties include the "cancer establishment", 
various influential medical and scientific journals, the 
medical profession as a whole, nutritionists, 
megavitamin therapists, the holistic health movement, 
the health food industry, the pharmaceutical industry, 
and the many tens of thousands of cancer patients who, 
largely as a result of Pauling's and Cameron's well-
publicized claims, currently take large daily doses of 
vitamin C. The dispute has become particularly intense 
over the claims and counterclaims surrounding the two 
negative clinical trials of vitamin C carried out by 
leading American oncologists at the Mayo Clinic in 
1979 and 1985 [6]. 
 
The literature on medical controversies is dominated by 
the standard positivist assumption that even the most 
protracted and rancorous conflicts may be resolved by 
the application of the scientific method to medicine in 
the form of the rigorously designed and properly 
applied controlled clinical trial (Lasagna, 1980; Doyle 
1983). In the case of disputes involving alternative or 
marginal therapies, analysts generally have uncritically 
adopted the orthodox "scientific" medical position. 
They focus almost exclusively on the "unscientific", 
"irrational" or "unproven" claims of the alternatives, 
and perceive their analytical task in terms of explaining 
the popular "mistaken" or "credulous" adherence to 
such scientifically unproven or unjustifiable therapies. 
The most partisan of these analysts are committed to 
the exposure of "quacks" and "charlatans", and their 
studies have been incorporated into the anti-quackery 
crusades of orthodox organizations such as the 
American Medical Association and the American 
Cancer Society (for example, Young 1967, 1972; 
Holland 1982) [7]. 
 
There is little in the literature on contemporary medical 
disputes, particularly those involving alternative 
therapies, that is consistent with a relativist 
epistemology. The more sociologically informed 
analyses by Petersen and Markle (1979a,b; Markle and 
Petersen, 1980) of the laetrile controversy avoided 
espousing the orthodox cause. They claimed a "causal, 
impartial and symmetrical" approach (1979b, 159). But 
their analyses still lent themselves to the standard view 
that the facts about disease and its treatment may be 
objectively determined, and that it is their 
interpretation from divergent social, political and 
ideological frameworks that accounts for the polarized 
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positions of the disputants and the lack of scientific 
resolution of the dispute. Their persistent demarcation 
of facts from values, their emphasis on the overtly 
expansionist "political" tactics of the laetrile 
proponents as opposed to the delimiting "scientific" 
tactics of their orthodox opponents, the care with which 
they dissociated their "equal time" treatment of both 
sides from any suggestion that "both sides have similar 
legitimacy" (1979b, 159), led to their de facto capture by 
orthodoxy. Petersen's and Markle's accounts of the 
laetrile proponents became a resource for the American 
Cancer Society's (ACS) "Unproven Methods" list (1987), 
and for such a notable "quackbuster" as William Jarvis 
in the ACS-endorsed "professional education 
publication", "Helping Your Patients Deal With 
Questionable Cancer Treatments" (1986, 8) [8]. 
 
As with Brian's analysis of the fluoridation debate, my 
own attempts at a neutral relativist analysis of the 
vitamin C and cancer controversy must be interpreted 
in the context of the dearth of relativist accounts of 
contemporary disputes over medical therapies. In this 
context, a symmetrical analysis that does not 
epistemologically privilege orthodox knowledge claims, 
but deals evenhandedly with the claims of orthodox 
oncologists and marginal therapists, is flying in the face 
of all tradition. As I soon found, it invites the suspicion 
and hostility of orthodoxy and the equally problematic 
embraces of the unorthodox. My thorough grounding 
in recent sociology of scientific knowledge had not 
equipped me to deal with the unintended consequences 
of my careful application of the interpretative tools of 
relativist analysis. 
 
I am a trained historian of science with a medical 
background. I became interested in controversy 
analysis primarily because I wanted a contemporary 
string to my bow. In 1981, I cast around for a topic and 
settled on the vitamin C controversy. I had read 
Pauling's (1970) well-known Vitamin C and the 
Common Cold, but I was not even aware that there was 
a vitamin C and cancer controversy until I did some 
preliminary reading in preparation for a research grant 
application. I got the grant and began my study. I did 
not at that stage take vitamin C, although I now do - 
when I remember to! 
 
I soon narrowed my study down to the cancer debate, 
which I found the most sociologically interesting and 
manageable. I decided on a social constructivist 
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comparison of the medical evaluations of vitamin C 
with those of 5-fluorouracil, a conventional but 
contentious cytotoxic drug, and with the putative 
wonder drug for cancer, interferon, that was then at the 
height of its hype. I presented a first paper on this 
comparison at our annual professional conference in 
Melbourne. The difference between researching issues 
on which the dust of history has safely settled and 
topical disputes was brought home to me when I was 
contacted by a reporter for a leading Australian 
newspaper. He interviewed me, obtained a copy of my 
paper, and published an article on my research (Anon. 
1983). I was then deluged with letters from members of 
the public (some of whom asked my advice about their 
medication), and various alternative practitioners and 
megavitamin entrepreneurs, all of whom interpreted 
me as supporting a pro-vitamin C position. I was also 
invited to write an article for an Australian alternative 
health journal, which I declined, as I did not want to 
jeopardize what I considered to be my neutral position. 
The only orthodox professional response I received was 
from a Sydney academic oncologist who had not seen 
the newspaper article, but who had been given a copy of 
my paper by one of his patients. This same oncologist 
tried, without success, to interest some of his colleagues 
in my analysis and to set up a clinical trial of vitamin C. 
 
I next sent copies of my paper to Linus Pauling and also 
to the leading oncologists at the Mayo Clinic who had 
carried out what was at that stage the only orthodox 
trial of vitamin C as a cancer treatment. This trial had 
given negative results which were disputed by Pauling 
and Ewan Cameron, who was collaborating with 
Pauling on the clinical assessment of vitamin C for 
terminal cancer patients. I had very cordial replies from 
both Pauling and Cameron (who was by then Medical 
Director of the Linus Pauling Institute at Palo Alto). 
Pauling congratulated me on my "fine" paper and 
offered a few criticisms of matters of detail and 
interpretation. He also requested that I keep him 
informed of its publication progress, as the Linus 
Pauling Institute might want to purchase some reprints 
for distribution. Cameron congratulated me for my 
"very good understanding" of the machinations of the 
cancer establishment and claimed, rather disturbingly, 
that his interpretation so completely coincided with 
mine, that he might have written my paper himself. 
 
My Mayo Clinic correspondents were less encouraging. 
One of them professed to find my study "intriguing" 
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and thought that it had broadened his "keen awareness 
relative to the impact of socioeconomic factors on 
cancer therapies". The other was Charles Moertel, 
nationally famous (or infamous if you prefer) for his 
recent demolition of laetrile as a cancer treatment as 
well as of vitamin C. Moertel pulled no punches in 
attempting to exercise his cognitive and social authority 
over this upstart from Australia. While he thought that 
the first part of my analysis was written with admirable 
style and considerable objectivity, he claimed that the 
second part of my paper (where I dealt with orthodox 
cancer research and treatment) had degenerated into a 
diatribe against the scientific conduct of medical 
practice and an endorsement of quacks and charlatans. 
According to Moertel, I had misstated and distorted 
facts and had quoted him out of context for the 
purposes of emphasizing my own personal philosophy. 
In other words, while he enjoyed reading my relativist 
analysis of the socio-economic shaping of the case for 
vitamin C, he condemned and rejected my analogous 
analysis of orthodox American cancer practices. 
Moertel claimed that my ringing defence of Linus 
Pauling was biased and he demanded correction of this. 
He concluded by stressing that he did not authorize my 
quotation of any part of his letter. As I was not 
prepared to rewrite my paper according to his 
prescription, I interpreted this letter as effectively 
blocking my access to this leading participant in the 
controversy. 
 
Up to this point I had relied on published papers and 
accounts for my analysis, but in 1984, as a result of my 
representations, Pauling and Cameron gave me access 
to their personal correspondence. I used part of my 
research grant to travel to the Linus Pauling Institute, 
and, for several months, with only minimal 
supervision, I ransacked their extensive files. These 
contained a wealth of source material, including not 
only hundreds of their letters to one another, but also 
their correspondence with their leading professional 
opponents in the dispute, with editors, research and 
funding bodies, and their manuscripts and referee's 
reports. I was given an office at the Institute for my 
personal use, and unrestricted access to a photocopier. 
As well, Pauling and Cameron made themselves 
available for a number of lengthy separate interviews 
on this and subsequent occasions. 
 
By contrast, my attempts to gain access to their 
orthodox opponents met with only limited success. The 
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editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, which 
published both negative trials of vitamin C but which 
had consistently refused to publish Pauling's and 
Cameron's papers, refused my request for an interview 
on the grounds that he was "too busy". The Director of 
the National Cancer Institute, who had engaged in an 
extensive correspondence with Pauling over the 
funding of vitamin C research and the interpretation of 
the Mayo Clinic trials, was also too busy for interview. 
He arranged for a stand-in who had had only limited 
involvement in the controversy, and who gave me one 
hour of his time and very guarded information and 
opinion. My request for access to relevant NCI 
documents was restricted to those that I already knew 
of through my study of the Pauling files and could 
specifically request. In short, I was forced to rely 
primarily on the Pauling-Cameron files, and on 
published material. 
 
This has resulted in a systematic bias in the 
documentation of the controversy, although this bias is 
not necessarily to the advantage of the vitamin C 
advocates. Perhaps its most significant implication is 
that it lays open to the closest scrutiny the expressed 
actions, beliefs and motivations of the supporters of 
vitamin C, while leaving those of their opponents 
undeclared except in so far as they are willing to 
represent them to the other side or in published 
accounts of their work. The main danger of this 
situation is that the claims of those most closely 
scrutinized may be perceived to be "biased" by the 
revelation of the supposedly "non-scientific" factors 
that have fed into their assumptions, procedures and 
presentation of their work, while those of their 
opponents remain relatively unscrutinized and, 
perhaps, may be presumed freer of such contaminating 
influences. 
 
In spite of my best efforts to steer a prudent path 
through the minefield of contemporary controversy 
analysis, I have become an involuntary participant in 
the dispute. I have not been able to dissociate myself 
from being viewed by the vitamin C advocates as an ally 
in their just struggle. Everything I write seems to 
confirm them in this opinion. 
 
In 1986 the British journal New Scientist published my 
account of the recently concluded and problematic 
second Mayo Clinic trial of vitamin C. Pauling had been 
unable to secure publication of his criticisms of this 
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trial in the mainstream medical or scientific literature, 
so my account was an important vehicle for their 
dissemination. As well, my New Scientist article was 
picked up and summarized by the American 
publication Medical Self-Care, and so made available 
to the alternative network (Freer 1986). After this, I 
found it possible to secure previously inaccessible and 
restricted documents and letters via alternative moles 
at the National Cancer Institute, the Office of 
Technology Assessment, and even the Mayo Clinic. 
 
When I recently returned to the Pauling Institute to 
update my material, I found myself and my work 
entering into Cameron's applications for NCI grants 
and his ongoing publication negotiations with the 
editor of the New England Journal of Medicine. 
Pauling cites my work in his public lectures on the 
Mayo Clinic "fraud", and refers his correspondents to it 
and to me. My 1988 paper in Social Studies of Science 
was viewed as a "scholarly" and "objective" account by 
Pauling and Cameron. Although they have not always 
agreed with my interpretation of events, I am regarded 
at the Linus Pauling Institute as the "official unbiased 
historian" of the dispute. 
 
On the other hand, my attempts to elicit some response 
to my work from orthodox American oncologists and 
nutritionists have met with very little success. Nor, in 
spite of my representations of their relevance to the 
major forthcoming report on the evaluation of 
unconventional cancer treatments, was I able to 
interest the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) in my published analyses of the vitamin C and 
cancer controversy. Vitamin C is featured in the OTA 
revised draft report as the unconventional treatment to 
have undergone the most complete orthodox testing. 
The detailed discussion of the Mayo Clinic trials is 
based on the OTA-commissioned report of Dr. Jack 
Yetiv, the author of a book summarizing recent 
scientific findings on popular nutritional practices 
(Yetiv 1986) and a contributing editor to Nutrition 
Forum, the leading popular journal devoted to the 
exposure of nutritional quackery. In his book, Yetiv's 
approach to the vitamin C controversy was the 
standard positivist one: that vitamin C has been tested 
in the two "carefully performed scientific studies" 
carried out by the Mayo Clinic, and that "current 
evidence clearly suggests that vitamin C has no role in 
the treatment of cancer" (1986, 183-4). This same 
partisan approach is evident in the section on vitamin C 
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in the OTA draft report, which gives no coverage to the 
Pauling-Cameron criticisms of the Mayo Clinic trials, 
nor to my own work. As a result of my representations, 
I was invited by the OTA to review this draft. My 
submission opposes Yetiv's interpretation, and 
disputes, on sociological grounds, the lack of symmetry 
in the OTA draft report. 
 
My position of neutral, symmetrical analysis has led 
finally to my active intervention in the dispute. I can 






First, sociological studies of contemporary 
controversies must be viewed as potential resources in 
social struggles over scientific or technical knowledge 
claims. Our experiences suggest that, more often than 
controversy analysts care to acknowledge, the analyst 
becomes a participant in what Latour and Woolgar 
have very aptly described as the "fierce fight to 
construct reality" (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). The 
analyst is at the front lines of the battle. It is so easy to 
be caught in the cross fire that many prefer to don 
positivist camouflage and seek shelter in the best-
fortified trench, rather than venture out into the no-
man's-land (which is even more a no-woman's-land) of 
sustained symmetry. The combatants have a good deal 
at stake in the sociologist's interpretation and 
presentation of news from the war zone. Their 
perceptions of what the analyst is up to, or rather, of 
what the analyst should be up to, inevitably enter into 
the reconstruction of the story. Both sides to a dispute 
have opposing and unshakeable convictions as to who 
are the heroes and the villains involved, and where 
truth and justice lie. If they do not welcome the 
analyst's attempt to deal symmetrically with the claims 
of their opponents, they may withdraw their 
cooperation or actively hinder the study. Alternatively, 
one side may react more sympathetically to the 
analysis, and attempt to win the analyst to their cause. 
 
This leads us to our second conclusion: an 
epistemologically symmetrical analysis of a controversy 
is almost always more useful to the side with less 
scientific credibility or cognitive authority. In other 
words, epistemological symmetry often leads to social 
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asymmetry or non-neutrality. The side with fewer 
scientifically and/or socially credentialed resources is 
more likely to attempt to enroll the researcher, whereas 
the better credentialed side views an epistemologically 
symmetrical analysis as threatening to their cognitive 
and social authority, and they are more likely to react to 
the analyst with hostility or suspicion. Each case we 
have discussed has followed this pattern. We do not 
consider our experiences to be unique. Without buying 
into the boundary dispute between discourse analysts 
and Bath relativists, we think that this is precisely what 
happened to Collins and Pinch in their study of 
parapsychology. Parapsychologists, who lacked the 
sources of cognitive and social power available to 
orthodox scientists, interpreted the symmetrical 
analysis of Collins and Pinch as support for their cause 
and deployed it in their struggle against the orthodox 
scientists. 
 
There is no reason to expect that discourse analysts are 
exempt from this process. As argued by Doran (1989), 
the discourse analysts are subject to the same problems 
of reflexivity and recursion as the strong program 
analysts they criticize. Discourse analysts certainly have 
not shown how they might avoid being captives of 
controversy. 
 
Our third conclusion is that the intervention by the 
analyst perturbs the dispute. Among other problems, 
this may make it more difficult for the analyst or other 
researchers to obtain access to participants and 
documents. It is possible, we suggest, for the analyst's 
"unwitting" intervention significantly to change the 
course of the controversy. 
 
So, methodological imperatives to the contrary, the 
controversy analyst, wittingly or not, may become a 
partisan participant in the debate. The view, raised to a 
principle in relativist approaches to controversy 
analysis, that social researchers must be neutral or 
apolitical observers, requires radical reassessment. The 
political role of the researcher must also be addressed 
in any full-blooded controversy analysis. Our position 
is that symmetrical analysis is an illusion: the 
methodological claim of neutral social analysis is a 
myth that can be no more sustained in actual practice 
than can the scientist's belief in a universal and 
efficacious scientific method. We think that an analytic 
insistence on the political role of the analyst cuts 
through the Gordian knot of the sterile reflexivity 
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debate. 
 
The irony of our analysis is that the guise of neutrality 
is one of the best ways to be an effective partisan. The 
positivist controversy analyst, employing a "sociology 
of error", is an effective supporter of scientific 
orthodoxy through stigmatizing its critics; the relativist 
analyst, through ostensible symmetry, is an effective 
supporter of the critics of orthodoxy by giving them 
unusual credence. An active partisan who undertakes 
either form of analysis has less credibility than an 
apparently independent and neutral person. This is 
precisely why partisans on one side point to the analyst, 
as independent authority, as support for their cause, 
while those on the other side try to paint the analyst as 
not being independent. 
 
Our analysis fits nicely into the framework of the "weak 
program of the sociology of scientific knowledge" as 
presented by Chubin and Restivo (1983). The weak 
program does not distinguish between the controversy 
and the analyst: the social scientist is automatically 
part of the controversy. The implication is that the 
analyst is more than a detached observer: the analyst 
should be critically involved, in the role of citizen. 
 
Although the weak program provides a theoretical 
solution to the problem of the disjunction between 
participants and analysts of controversies, it provides 
no practical solution to the dilemmas posed by the 
prospect of being a captive of controversy. The analyst 
may employ a positivist analysis, a strong program 
analysis, a weak program analysis, or whatever. But 
that is simply the analyst's self-description. The (other) 
controversy partisans are likely to ignore motivations 
and methods and try to enroll, discredit, or otherwise 
deal with the analyst as their interests dictate. The 
implications of this for the study of controversies 
remain to be fully assessed. 
 
Footnotes 
1 Some excellent surveys are Engelhardt and Caplan 
(1987) and Nelkin (1979). 
2 Key works in relativist controversy analysis include 
Collins (1981; 1985), Pickering (1984) and Pinch 
(1986). 
3 For a full account of the history of the laboratory see 
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Scott (1986), or for a shorter version Scott (1988b). 
4 For a more detailed discussion see Martin 
(forthcoming), where the relation between social 
science work critical of fluoridation and participation in 
the debate is also discussed. 
5 No relation to Brian Martin. 
6 For a detailed analysis of the vitamin C and cancer 
dispute see Richards (1988 and forthcoming). 
7 The most notable exception to such positivist 
orthodox partisanship is Harris Coulter's (1973) 
scholarly account of the historical conflict between 
homeopathy and the American Medical Association. 
Coulter mounted a stinging attack on orthodox drug 
therapy and claimed that homeopathy was more 
"scientific" than the former. 
8 In their most recent account of the laetrile 
controversy, Markle and Petersen (1987) are less 
cautious in their dissection of the role of orthodoxy in 
the conflict. It remains to be seen how this more critical 
account is viewed by orthodoxy. 
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